

## Message Text

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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
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CONGEN HONG KONG 113  
USLO PEKING

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 6320

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, NATO, CH, UR, VN  
SUBJECT: CANADIAN ANALYSIS OF LE DUAN'S VISIT T TO MOSCOW

1. PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 18 POLADS MEETING, CANDIAN REP (FOWELL)  
CIRCULATED THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF LE DUAN'S RECENT VISIT  
TO MOSCOW. IN THEIR ANALYSIS THE CANADIANS CONCLUDED THAT, WHILE  
THE DGV WILL UNDOUBTEDLY TRY TO REMAIN INDEPENDENT OF BOTH THE  
PRC AND USSR, THE VISIT TENDED TO INDICATE "A DECIDED TILT IN  
THE DIRECTION OF THE SOVIETS."

2. IN THE POLADS MEETING ITSELF, HOWEVER, THE CANDIAN REP  
BACKED AWAY SOMEWHAT FROM THE CONCLUSION OF A DECIDED DRV TILT  
TOWARDS MOSCOW. HE SAID THAT, ON THE BASIS OF FURTHER REPORTING  
FROM CANADA'S EMBASSIES IN MOSCOW AND PEKING, "TILT" WAS TOO  
STRONG A WORD AND THAT IT WOULD BE MORE ACCURATE TO SAY THAT  
HANOI FINDS ITS RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW "EASIER AND MORE REWARDING"  
THAN THOSE WITH PEKING. MOREOVER, IN CANADIAN VIEW, PEKING'S  
SILENCE ON THE TRIP AND DRV AFFAIRS IN GENERAL BELIED CHINESE  
ANXIETY OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN VIET-NAM.

3. BEGIN TEXT:  
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LE DUAN VISIT TO USSR

THE LE DUAN VISIT TO MOSCOW MAY WELL MARK AN  
IMPORTANT TURNING POINT IN VIETNAM-USSR RELATIONS WHICH

WILL ALSO AFFECT CHINESE INTERESTS. THE THEME OF THE VISIT IS SUMMED UP IN THE PHRASE "FULL IDENTITY OF THEIR VIEWS ON ALL QUESTIONS DISCUSSED" WHICH WAS USED ON MANY OCCASIONS, INCLUDING THE DECLARATION SIGNED BY BREZHNEV AND LE DUAN. WHILE THE DRV WILL UNDOUBTEDLY TRY TO REMAIN INDEPENDENT OF BOTH THE USSR AND CHINA, THIS VISIT TO MOSCOW WOULD INDICATE A DECIDED TILT IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SOVIETS.

THE EIGHT PAGE DECLARATION WHICH, WHILE EXTREMELY LAUDATORY OF EACH OTHER, CONTAINS SIGNIFICANT IDEOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNANIMITY WHICH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY SET CHINESE EARS RINGING.

THE DRV WAS CHARACTERIZED BOTH IN THE DECLARATION AND BREZHNEV'S SPEECH AS THE "REAL OUTPOST OF SCIALISM IN INDOCHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA". LE DUAN FOR HIS PART STATED THAT THE VIETNAMESE WERE FULLY RESOLVED "TO DO THEIR UTMOST TO MAKE THE GREAT VIETNAMESE-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP ETERNAL AND INVIOABLE".

WHILE THE CHINESE ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED, THE INTERNATIONAL ISSUES SECTION OF THE DECLARATION CONTAINS A THINLY DISGUISED REBUKE TO CHINESE POLICIES. SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IS THE "RENUNCIATION OF DIKTAT AND USE OF FORCE IN SETTTLING DISPUTES AND DIFFERENCES", WHICH IS OBVIOUSLY AIMED AT THE CHINESE-JAPANESE HEGEMONY ISSUE. MORE EMPHATICALLY, THE VIETNAM WORKERS PARTY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRV EXPRESS THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE FOREIGN POLICY ACTIONS OF THE CPSU AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WHICH AIM AT "IMPLEMENTING THE LENINIST PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, AT SUPPORTING THE STRUGGLE OF PEOPLES FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS, AT THE COMPREHENSIVE STRENGTHENING OF UNIVERSAL PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, AND AT MAKING DETENTE IRREVERSIBLE". THIS LATTER STATEMENT IS DIRECTLY AIMED AT THE CHINESE.

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SOVIET DEFENCE MINISTER GRECHKO WAS VERY MUCH IN EVIDENCE THROUGHOUT ALL STAGES OF THE VISIT, ALTHOUGH DEFENCE ISSUES OR MILITARY ASSISTANCE WERE NOT MDADE PUBLIC.

ALTHOUGH WE MUST BE CAREFUL IN DUDGING VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS, THE VISIT SEEMS TO MARK A SIGNIFICANT SWING BY THE DRV TOWARDS THE USSR. LE DUAN DID, OF COURSE, MAKE HIS FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO PEKING, POSSIBLY HAVING IN MIND HIS ULTIMATE INTENTION OF SLANTING HIS POLICIES TOWARD MOSCOW. THE MOTIVATION IS PROBABLY:

(1) THE ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES OFFERED BY THE USSR ARE WORTH MORE THAN CAN BE GIVEN BY THE CHINESE

(ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND CO-OPERATION ORIENTED  
TO DRV ECONOMIC PLANNING FIGURED PROMINENTLY  
IN THE VISIT); AND

(2) THE NEED TO BALANCE CHINESE PRESSURE BY SOVIET  
FRIENDSHIP.

THE PRICE FOR THIS LINE-UP IS A CONCESSION TO  
MOSCOW ON THE IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL FRONTS. FROM  
HERE THIS PRICE DOES NOT SEEM EXORBITANT BUT IT MAY LOOK  
DIFFERENT FROM PEKING AND THE CHINESE REACTION WILL BE  
INTERESTING AS AN INDICATION OF THEIR IDEA OF THE  
CURRENT BALANCE SHEET IN THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL  
INFLUENCE IN VIETNAM.

THE RUSSIANS HAVE HAD A LONG AND OFTEN  
FRUSTRATING EXPERIENCE WITH THE VIETNAMESE AND PROBABLY  
REALIZE THAT PROMISES, DECLARATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION DO  
NOT ALWAYS IN THE END AMOUNT TO THE SAME THING. BUT THE  
SOVIET STAKE, ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY, IS VERY HIGH  
AND, GIVEN THEIR LACK OF SUCCESS IN OTHER PARTS OF SOUTH-  
EAST ASIA, PRESUMABLY THEY WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE TOP  
PRIORITY TO CONSOLIDATING THEIR POSITION IN VIETNAM.  
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